Trinity of Time, the Observer, and the Observed: A Relative Reality Ranadeva Jayasekera

Abstract

This paper explores the intersection of philosophy, cognitive science, and mathematics by investigating how concepts of impermanence and non-self, shape human experiences of time and identity. I propose that time, traditionally seen as linear, but experienced subjectively as fluid and dynamic, only exists if and only if, a priori, a “self” exists. Drawing from recent research in psychology, quantum theory, and contemplative neuroscience, the paper demonstrates how the constructs of “me” and “mine” emerge through fragmented perceptual processes. It argues that unravelling this narrative offers profound implications for mental well-being and suggests applications for mindfulness-based interventions to deconstruct self-attachment.

Introduction: Perception and Reality through Sensory Systems

Let’s do a small thought experiment. We conceptualise the world through the information we get from our sensory organs, and a complex deductive process carried out by our brain. Let’s for simplicity focus on our vision, and its information and deduction process associated. So, for argument’s sake, our actor has one sensory organ, the eye, but the rational can be extended to all other organs that make up a complete human. We ‘see’ an object when essentially three ingredients sync together. (1) A particle or a wave emerging from the relevant object (2) The wave/particle connecting to the eye as the sensory organ, (3) the nerve system that communicates this signal to the brain, and the brain that then compares the attributes of the information contained in this signal with a pre-established database and giving a certain conclusion or perception. The final artefact of this process is that our actor sees or recognises the relevant object (e.g. car) and the whole process takes place in a tiny infinitesimally small time scale, and we deduce the time lapse as instantaneous.

Our sensory experience of reality emerges from an intricate interplay between sensory input, neural processing, and cognitive interpretation. Perception involves more than passive reception of external stimuli—it requires the brain to construct meaning from sensory data. It requires our sensory organs to collect external signals that are processed by the brain, creating coherent experiences that we interpret as “real.” Research in cognitive science highlights how vision, for example, follows a process of detecting photons or light waves, which activate the retina and transmit signals via the optic nerve to the brain's visual cortex (Goldstein & Brockmole, 2016). Neuroscience research demonstrates that the visual system, for example, functions by capturing photons that interact with retinal cells, generating signals that travel through the optic nerve to the visual cortex (Hubel & Wiesel, 2004). These signals are then compared with stored neural patterns to generate recognition—a car, a face, or another familiar object (Grill-Spector & Weiner, 2014). This reinforces my argument that the act of perception inherently involves temporal and interpretative delays that contribute to the illusory nature of reality. Reality, as we experience it, emerges from the interaction between sensory inputs and cognitive processes. Neuroscientific models emphasize that sensory perception is not a direct mirroring of the external world, but an active reconstruction by the brain (Friston, 2010). Every perception is mediated by processes such as predictive coding, which enable the brain to compare incoming stimuli with prior expectations (Clark, 2013). ________________________________________

The Construction of 'Me' and 'Mine' in Perception

However, what is perhaps not so apparent and inherently hidden in this process is the creation of a ‘me’ for the car to be recognised. Logically, it is impossible to recognise or recollect any entity or feeling in an absolute sense because the very notion of perceiving is pegged to the existence of an owner that recognises and perceives this object or feeling (see appendix 1). Further investigation concludes that when the object of the car is recognised, a priori, not only is a ‘me’ created but also a distinctive shade of ‘mine’ associated with the ‘me’ is created as well . Hence, for every moment the recognition occurs so does the creation of a ‘me’ and an associated ‘mine’ as a priori for recognition (see appendix 2). This discussion on how the recognition of objects generates the illusory constructs of “me” and “mine” aligns with the growing body of research on the self as a cognitive construct. Contemporary neuroscience suggests that what we call the self emerges from a distributed network of neural activity in brain regions like the default mode network, which supports introspection and self-referential thought (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004).

Those attuned to mathematics would identify these separate “me’s”, as series of extremely high frequency observations, yet by nature completely independent of each other thus analogues to an Independently distributed process. Similarly, this analogy to independent distributed processes mirrors cognitive models that treat individual moments of perception as discrete but rapidly occurring events. This conceptualization resonates with theories of discontinuous consciousness, which argue that our sense of continuous selfhood is an illusion created by the brain stitching together discrete experiences (Wittmann, 2018). In simpler language, these “me’s” that are created every time perceiving occurs are essentially unconnected but occurring at an extremely high frequency, with an infinitesimal time separation.

These moments of perceiving arise, exist and decay momentarily and essentially do not exhibit any relationship with the subsequent moments. The mind is blind to this inherent process due to the pace at which it occurs, hence connects these ‘me’ dots and creates a narrative of a person. Again, mathematicians might see this narrative as analogues to a path dependant stochastic process created by the series of ‘me’s, that have an embedded memory function. Research in cognitive neuroscience reveals that the self is not a fixed essence but a dynamic construct, continuously reassembled by mental processes (Damasio, 1999). Experimental studies demonstrate that people’s sense of continuity—of a persistent "me"—depends on temporal binding mechanisms, which integrate sensory information over short time intervals (Pöppel, 2009). In fact, experiences such as flow states or meditation reveal that disrupting the narrative self can diminish the feeling of a fixed identity (Lutz et al., 2007).

Cognitive neuroscience has increasingly shown that the self is not a fixed, unified entity, but an emergent process arising from brain activity in the default mode network (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004). Experimental studies on self-referential thought and narrative identity show that the self is updated continuously through a process of temporal binding, where discrete moments of experience are merged into a coherent narrative (Pöppel, 2009; Wittmann, 2018). The analogy of the independent distributed (ID) “me’s” reflects this discontinuous nature. Each perceptual event creates a transient "self" that dissolves as the next moment arises—mirroring the high-frequency, transient nature of neural firing.This suggests that the persistent sense of a unified "me" is a cognitive illusion generated by memory and narrative stitching (Metzinger, 2004).

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Time Perception as Illusion

By the “time” perception occurs, albeit infinitesimally small, the object (i.e. the car in my example) that emitted the light wave or the particle would itself have undergone an infinitesimally small change due to the everchanging transforming process associated with all matter/energy. Hence the perception, which itself is created through a process of arising, existence and passing away can never be the actual state of the object, thus creating an even grander illusion. Perception is not instantaneous but operates on discrete time intervals, generally around 80 to 100 milliseconds per conscious visual event (VanRullen & Koch, 2003). This microscopic time gap, though imperceptible, suggests that reality as experienced is always slightly out of sync with the changing external world. In essence, perception constructs an image of the past, not the present . This argument that perception is inherently out of sync with reality—since objects change even within the time taken for recognition—corresponds with recent findings in temporal neuroscience. Research indicates that subjective time perception is not an accurate mirror of external time. For instance, studies have shown that dopamine levels in the brain can speed up or slow down the perception of time, creating discrepancies between physical time and experienced time (Wiener et al., 2011). The moment a tacit understanding that perceiving gives rise to arising and passing away of a series of unrelated “me’s ”, forming an illusion of a non-existent reality occurs, then the narrative of a ‘me’ comes to a grinding halt. In quantum physics, the idea that time is not fundamental but emergent from interactions between systems aligns with the notion that fixed states are illusory. Smolin (2013) argues that time is relational, emerging only from interactions between changing entities. Cognitive science further supports this idea by showing how predictive coding models of perception shape our experience of time as a function of expectations and prior knowledge (Friston, 2010). Recent developments in temporal neuroscience highlight that our experience of time is not an objective reflection of external reality but is shaped by subjective and context-dependent mechanisms. This aligns with the claim that the perceived object (the car) has already changed by the time it is recognized—suggesting that our experience of the present moment is always temporally mismatched with objective reality. Moreover, predictive coding models suggest that time perception arises from the brain’s attempts to minimize prediction errors by compressing temporal events into coherent sequences (Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013). This means that what we experience as a continuous flow of time is, in fact, a patchwork of discrete events, akin to a stochastic process in which each moment is shaped by previous states but lacks inherent continuity (Wittmann, 2018). Cognitive science further reveals that time itself is a mental construct, shaped by attention and memory. According to subjective time theories, the brain constructs a sense of duration and temporal flow through the integration of discrete perceptual events (Eagleman, 2009). This means that our experience of time is not objective but deeply intertwined with how we engage with the world at any given moment.

These findings reinforce the argument that existence is inseparable from time, but neither requires a fixed self to experience it. Instead, the sense of self emerges as a byproduct of temporally situated experiences, constantly shifting according to the individual’s engagement with the environment.

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The impossibility of conceptualising a Self and Identity even in an ever-changing form

Now, on the notion of continuity inferred through the enduring physical forms of our bodies, I believe is the manifestation of the world that we create in our minds, individually by taking in the information we digest through our 6 sensory organs as essentially ‘fixed’ albeit for a short time. For example, take the transition from an infant to a toddler (see appendix 3). If a bundle of matter/energy conforms to a certain set of attributes, which we have preconceived based on our memory and judgement conforms to a certain standard (weight, skin tone, behaviour etc) we call that bundle of matter/ energy, an infant. After some “time” if this bundle of matter/energy conforms to a different set of standards (heavier, different behaviour etc.) based on the pre-programmed information, we call this bundle a ‘toddler’. The example of the transition from infant to toddler elegantly illustrates the human tendency to impose discrete labels on continuous phenomena. Cognitive psychology explains this through categorization bias, where continuous changes are chunked into predefined categories to simplify cognitive processing (Barrett, 2017). However, these categories are mental constructs with no fixed reality—the "infant" and "toddler" are conceptual snapshots of a continuously evolving process. In neuroscience, this idea is supported by research on neural plasticity, which shows that the brain itself is in a constant state of change, with synaptic connections being reformed and pruned throughout life (Edelman & Gally, 2013). Thus, even the physical form we identify with as "self" is never the same from one moment to the next, further reinforcing the illusion of permanence.

We essentially move from a fixed, state to state in our minds (infant, toddler etc.) whereas in reality there was never an infant nor a toddler but just an ever changing bundle of matter / energy in a constant state of flux. This perspective is corroborated by neuroscience research that finds no central "self" region in the brain; instead, self-representation emerges dynamically from interactions between various cognitive systems (Metzinger, 2004).

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Conclusion: Ending the Narrative of 'Me'

So…one might ask, what’s the big deal. One is an internalisation of discreet (fixed) steps and the other is a continuum. The issue is, when it is fixed, it is in the human nature to create attachments or repulsion (as the case may be) to these fixed notions, this creating an elusive reality thus forming the route cause of all suffering. The notion that attachment to fixed identities (e.g., “infant,” “toddler”) generates suffering aligns with research in affective neuroscience. Studies suggest that emotional attachment to mental constructs (which is an all-inclusive universal set, as we perceive everything through our minds)—whether of self, others, or objects—can generate psychological distress when those constructs are disrupted (Panksepp, 1998). Hence the realisation that the concept of time itself can only be valid so long as the narrative of ‘me’ takes shape, can be truly profound. This paper concludes that the realization of time, self, and perception as illusory processes can halt the narrative of "me." This insight mirrors mindfulness research, which shows that practices aimed at observing thoughts and feelings without attachment can diminish the sense of a fixed self and reduce suffering (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Neuroimaging studies confirm that meditation practices disrupt the default mode network, which is associated with self-referential thought, leading to reduced rumination and increased well-being (Garrison et al., 2015).

This realization aligns with non-dual philosophies that view the self and the world not as separate entities but as interdependent processes. In this view, time itself is a construct that only exists insofar as the narrative of "me" persists. The cessation of this narrative, culminating with the complete dissolution of both the observer and the observed, leads to a profound shift in perception—one that reveals the interconnected, ever-changing nature of existence.

References

Barrett, L. F. (2017). How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(3), 181-204.

Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt.

Eagleman, D. (2009). How the Mind Constructs Time. Science, 326(5956), 1673-1677.

Edelman, G. M., & Gally, J. A. (2013). Reentry: A key mechanism for integration of brain function. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 7, 63.

Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11(2), 127-138.

Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: Implications for cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(1), 14-21.

Garrison, K. A., Zeffiro, T. A., Scheinost, D., Constable, R. T., & Brewer, J. A. (2015). Meditation leads to reduced default mode network activity beyond an active task. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 15(3), 712-720.

Gazzaniga, M. S. (1998). The Mind's Past. University of California Press.

Grill-Spector, K., & Weiner, K. S. (2014). The functional architecture of the ventral temporal cortex and its role in categorization. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 15(8), 536-548.

Metzinger, T. (2004). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. MIT Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith.

Pöppel, E. (2009). Pre-semantically defined temporal windows for cognitive processing. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364(1525), 1887-1896.

Smolin, L. (2013). Time Reborn: From the Crisis in Physics to the Future of the Universe. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

VanRullen, R., & Koch, C. (2003). Is perception discrete or continuous? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(5), 207-213.

Wiener, M., Turkeltaub, P., & Coslett, H. B. (2011). The image of time: a voxel-wise meta-analysis. NeuroImage, 54(3), 2236-2247.

Wittmann, M. (2018). The Inner Sense of Time: How the Brain Creates a Sense of Past, Present, and Future. MIT Press.

Appendix 1

Mathematical Proof: Time and Observed Objects Exist if and only if an Observer Exists

This proof takes an interdisciplinary approach, blending elements of logic, set theory, and philosophy of mathematics, with support from epistemology and quantum theory. It aims to show that time and objects can only be meaningfully defined relative to an observer, and they lack independent existence in the absence of such an observer. This proof is grounded on relationalism (as in Leibniz's theory of time and space), the observer effect in quantum mechanics, and modern theories of cognition.

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1. Definitions and Assumptions

Before I proceed with the proof, I need to formalize the terms involved:

Observer O: A cognitive entity capable of generating conscious experience, forming beliefs, or making measurements. It could be a human, a sentient being, or an abstract system that fulfils the criteria of awareness.

Time T: A sequence of events or states, understood as either continuous or discrete intervals. Here, T is treated as a function that maps ordered events onto a linearly ordered set, i.e., T :E→R

Object X: An element that has some identifiable properties P(X) that can be perceived by an observer O. This includes material objects and abstract entities within the phenomenological world.

Observation: A mapping Obs:{X,T}→O, where objects and time are only meaningful insofar as they are correlated with an observer’s mental state or measurement.

Existence Ɛ : I take the statement “X exists” or “T exists” to mean that X or T belongs to the set of observables Oo, the set of all phenomena available to the observer O. Formally:

Ɛ (X,T)⟺(X,T)∈ Oo

2. Logical Framework

I will use if and only if (iff) logic to show mutual dependency between the existence of time/objects and the presence of an observer.

I aim to prove: (X∧T) ⟺  O

Which translates to: Objects and time exist if and only if an observer exists.

I structure the proof as follows:

Prove that if there is no observer O, then neither time T nor objects X exist.

Prove that if time or objects exist, an observer necessarily exists.

I will use proof by contradiction and relational arguments to demonstrate these points.

3. Proof by Contradiction: Non-Existence Without an Observer

Assume, for contradiction, that time T and an object X exist independently of any observer.

If there is no observer O, then X must exist without any perception, measurement, or awareness of it. That is:(X∈ Oo )=∅ .However, an unobserved object X has no distinguishable properties P(X), since properties can only be identified relative to an observer. Thus: P(X)=∅. This implies that X cannot be said to "exist" in any meaningful way, as it lacks definable attributes.

Similarly, if there is no observer, time T becomes undefined. In physics and mathematics, time is typically understood through the sequence or change of states e1E={ e1, e2, e3,… }. But in the absence of an observer, there is no way to distinguish between successive states. This leads to: T(E)=∅. Since time depends on the relation between distinguishable events, which in turn require observation, time loses coherence without an observer.

Thus, the assumption that time and objects exist without an observer leads to a contradiction: without the act of observation, neither properties nor temporal sequence can exist.

4. Observer-Dependent Relationality of Time and Objects

I now show the if-direction, i.e., if time T and objects X exist, then an observer must exist.

Relational Definition of Time:

From Leibnizian relationalism, time is understood only as a measure of relations between events. In quantum mechanics, relational time is evident: the state of a quantum system evolves only relative to an observation. If no observer exists, there is no meaningful state evolution, since time only arises through interaction with a measuring apparatus.

Quantum Measurement Problem:

In quantum theory, the collapse of the wave function occurs only when a measurement is performed—i.e., when there is an observer (or measurement apparatus). Without the observer, all systems remain in a superposition of states. Thus, the "object" as we know it emerges only upon observation, supporting the idea that objects are observer-dependent.

Neuroscientific Perspective on Time and Objects:

Cognitive science shows that time and object perception arise from brain processes (Eagleman, 2009). Without an observer’s cognitive machinery, time has no phenomenological meaning, and objects cannot be distinguished from one another. This further supports that objects and time are contingent on the act of observation.

Thus, whenever objects and time are said to exist, an observer must exist to make them meaningful.

5. Conclusion: Necessity of an Observer for Existence

I have proven the mutual dependency between observer, time, and objects:

If there is no observer, there is no meaningful existence of time or objects—as demonstrated by the contradictions in my initial assumption.

If time and objects exist, an observer necessarily exists—as relational and cognitive theories show that these constructs require perception and measurement.

Thus, I conclude:

(X∧T)  ⟺  O

In other words, time and objects exist if and only if an observer exists.

Further Evidence: Time as a Cognitive Construct________________________________________

Studies on the default mode network (DMN) suggest that self-referential thought involves predicting, reflecting, and integrating sensory data into a coherent self-model (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2010).

The self emerges through attention, memory, and prediction, indicating that the mind actively constructs a sense of continuity across time.

Neuroscientific studies show that time perception depends on attention and memory processes. Without memory, experiences remain isolated, making the flow of time incoherent. Illusions of time dilation and contraction (Eagleman, 2009) further demonstrate that time is subjectively constructed based on cognitive and emotional states. Time emerges from the self’s capacity to sequence events, revealing its dependence on subjective experience.

Memory: Constructs the past by integrating events into coherent narratives.

Anticipation: Allows the self to project into the future, creating a sense of temporal flow.

These findings show that time cannot exist independently of the mind’s construction of a self.

This framework presents a rigorous argument for the interdependence of time, self, and existence, suggesting that time only has meaning insofar as a self exists to experience it. Through an interdisciplinary synthesis of philosophy and cognitive science, I challenge objective notions of time and open the door to new explorations of consciousness.

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References

Carhart-Harris, R. L., & Friston, K. J. (2010). The default-mode, ego-functions, and free-energy: A neurobiological account of Freudian ideas. Brain, 133(4), 1265-1283.

Eagleman, D. M. (2009). Brain Time: Understanding the Temporal Flow of Consciousness. The New York Academy of Sciences.

Rovelli, C. (1997). Relational Quantum Mechanics. International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 35(8), 1637–1678.

Leibniz, G. W. (1714). Monadology.

Wheeler, J. A. (1990). Information, Physics, Quantum: The Search for Links. In Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information.

Smolin, L. (2013). Time Reborn: From the Crisis in Physics to the Future of the Universe. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Appendix 2

Mathematical-Philosophical Proof: Time is a Construct of the Mind, Dependent on the Notion of the ‘Self’

I present a rigorous interdisciplinary proof—drawing from philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and mathematical logic—that the concept of time only holds meaning if the notion of a “self” exists, and since the self is a construct of the mind, time too is a mental construct. The proof will argue that time cannot have independent reality; rather, it emerges from the existence of a conscious observer with a constructed sense of self. The argument takes inspiration from Kant’s theory of time as an internal condition for perception, cognitive neuroscience studies on self-referential thought, and theories in quantum mechanics on observer-dependence.

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1. Definitions and Assumptions

Time T: A sequence or ordering of events that allows for the differentiation between “before,” “now,” and “after.” Mathematically, time can be modelled as a function T:E→{R}that maps events E to real numbers. Time will here be treated as phenomenological, i.e., dependent on experience.

Self S: A cognitive structure that gives rise to subjective experience. In philosophy and neuroscience, the self is viewed as a construct (Metzinger, 2004), emerging from the brain's interpretation of sensory input and self-referential thought processes.

Existence {E}: For any phenomenon to exist in a meaningful sense, it must be observed, measured, or conceived by some cognitive system. I assume existence to be a function of subjective experience: E(X)  ⟹  X ∈ OS , where OS is the set of observables available to a constructed self S.

Observer-Dependent Nature of Time and Existence: Following relationalism (Rovelli, 1997), I assume that time and objects are not absolute entities but exist only relative to observers. I also draw from quantum mechanics, where the state of a system is determined upon measurement or interaction with an observer (Wheeler, 1990).________________________________________

2. Logical Framework

I aim to prove:

Time has meaning if and only if a self is constructed.

T  ⟺  S

This can be decomposed into two key statements:

If there is no self, there can be no concept of time.

If time exists as a meaningful concept, a self must exist prior.

I will use proof by contradiction to demonstrate both directions of this biconditional relationship.

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3. Proof: No Time Without the Construct of the Self

Part 1: Contradiction from Time Without a Self

Assume, for contradiction, that time exists independently of the self S.

If time T is to exist, events E={e1, e2 ,e3,… } must be ordered according to the relation e1< e2 < e3 …. However, the notion of ordering requires observation—to say that event e2 occurred after e1 presupposes the existence of an observer capable of distinguishing between events.

Without an observer, the sequence of events is meaningless since there would be no entity to assign or experience this sequence. This mirrors the idea in quantum mechanics that a superposition of states becomes real only upon measurement. If there is no observer with an awareness of e1, e2 ,e3 the concept of temporal progression collapses.

Thus, time T cannot exist in the absence of a self-aware observer.

Part 2: The Self Must Exist for Time to Have Meaning

I now show that the notion of a self is necessary for time to be meaningful.

Cognitive neuroscience demonstrates that the perception of time arises from the brain’s construction of self-referential experience (Wittmann, 2018). The brain integrates discrete sensory moments into a coherent narrative, creating the illusion of a continuous flow of time. The default mode network, responsible for self-referential thought, is implicated in this temporal experience (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004).

If there is no self to construct and interpret these experiences, time becomes meaningless. This aligns with phenomenological philosophy, which posits that time is experienced as an internal construct of consciousness, not as an objective entity (Heidegger, 1927).

Therefore, for time to have any meaning, it is necessary for a self S to be constructed.

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4. Proof: The Self as a Construct Implies Time is a Construct

Finally, I show that since the self itself is a construct of the mind, time must also be a mental construct.

Neuroscience research (Metzinger, 2004) indicates that the self is an illusory model generated by the brain to integrate sensory information into a coherent experience. If the self is not a fixed or intrinsic entity but a construct, then all phenomena that depend on the self—such as time—must also be constructs.

This aligns with Kant’s philosophy: time is not a property of the external world but a subjective framework through which we structure experience (Kant, 1781).

Merleau-Ponty (1945) also deconstructs the notion of a stable self by showing that perception is fragmented and fluctuating. Each moment of awareness is shaped by how we are oriented within time and space, suggesting that there is no unchanging self nor a continuous self but instead consists of discrete moments of awareness, embodied encounters with the world.

Thus, since time depends on the self, and the self is a mental construct, it follows that time itself is a construct of the mind.

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5. Conclusion: Time Exists if and only if a Self Exists

I have demonstrated the following:

If there is no self, time cannot exist, as the ordering of events requires subjective experience.

If time exists, a self must exist, since the perception of time relies on self-referential thought processes.

Since the self is a construct of the mind, time must also be a mental construct.

Thus, I conclude that:

T  ⟺  S

This result not only challenges the notion of objective time but also supports the idea that both time and self are emergent phenomena constructed by the mind. These findings have profound implications for the fields of philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, and quantum mechanics.

4. Dependency of Time on Self-Awareness

Next, I establish the converse: If time exists, then a notion of self must exist.

Perceptual Dependency:

The perception of time as an interval between events implies an observer capable of distinguishing these intervals. The notion of a self provides the cognitive framework that allows the differentiation of "past," "present," and "future." Cognitive psychology shows that temporal awareness requires the binding of perceptual moments into a coherent narrative, a process fundamentally linked to self-awareness (Pöppel, 2004).

Self as the Agent of Temporal Integration:

Quantum theory and the concept of the "observer effect" suggest that measurement (a form of observation) gives meaning to time. If there is no self to observe or measure, the superposition of states in quantum mechanics remains unresolved, suggesting that time does not "exist" in a definite form without an observer (Wheeler, 1990).

Philosophical Argument: Existential Relationality:

According to existential philosophers like Sartre, the self creates meaning by relating to its experiences (Sartre, 1943). In the absence of the self, no relationships can be established between sequential experiences, rendering time unintelligible.

Neuroscientific Corroboration:

Neuroimaging studies show that disruptions in self-referential networks, such as the DMN, can lead to altered experiences of time (Garrison et al., 2015). Therefore, the notion of a self is not only necessary for meaningful time perception but also actively shapes how time is experienced.

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5. Conclusion: Self as a Necessary Condition for Time

I have established that:

Time cannot be meaningfully defined without the existence of a self, as shown by contradictions in the assumption that time can exist independently.

Whenever time has meaning, it implies the existence of a self, as time requires a perceiving entity to structure and interpret temporal experiences.

Further Evidence

Protagoras’s dictum, “Man is the measure of all things,” emphasizes the relativity of truth to individual perception. This resonates with the idea that time and existence only have meaning relative to an experiencing subject, though that subject need not be a continuous self. In a world of discrete, independent experiences, existence emerges moment by moment, with meaning contingent upon the subject’s engagement with the present. This suggests that time itself is a phenomenological artifact emerging from self-experience and implies that time is intrinsically tied to consciousness; without a subject to order events, time ceases to exist meaningfully. Without a self—a subjective locus that organizes perception—time has no relevance, as it is inherently tied to self-aware experiences such as memory, anticipation, and perception of change. This conclusion suggests that time and self are mutually constructed phenomena, both dependent on the mind for their coherence. Time is only meaningful if a ‘self’ exists, and that the self is a construct of the mind. I show that the experience of time requires the existence of a cognitive framework—a self—that can organize and interpret events. Building on philosophy (Kant, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) and findings from cognitive science, I argue that time itself is not a property of the external world but a mental construct. Without the construction of a self, existence becomes indeterminate, and without existence, time has no meaningful reference. The argument demonstrates that time is inseparable from conscious experience and is thus a subjective phenomenon shaped by the mind.

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References

Brewer, J. A., Garrison, K. A., & Whitfield-Gabrieli, S. (2011). What about the "self" is processed in the default mode network? NeuroImage, 57(2), 608-611.

Garrison, K. A., Zeffiro, T. A., & Brewer, J. A. (2015). Meditation leads to reduced default mode network activity beyond an active task. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 15(3), 712-720.

Heidegger, M. (1927). Being and Time.

Husserl, E. (1928). Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Trans. John Brough. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Kant, I. (1781). Critique of Pure Reason.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Donald A. Landes.

Metzinger, T. (2004). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. MIT Press.

Northoff, G., & Bermpohl, F. (2004). The Default Mode Network and Self-Referential Processing. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(3), 102-107.

Pöppel, E. (2004). Lost in time: A historical frame, elementary processing units, and the 3-second window. Acta Neurobiologiae Experimentalis, 64(3), 295-301.

Rovelli, C. (1997). Relational Quantum Mechanics. International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 35(8), 1637–1678.

Sartre, J.-P. (1943). Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes. Philosophical Library.

Wheeler, J. A. (1990). Information, Physics, Quantum: The Search for Links. In Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information.

Wittmann, M. (2018). The Inner Sense of Time: How the Brain Creates a Sense of Past, Present, and Future. MIT Press.

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Appendix 3

On the Erroneous Conception of Decay: A Proof of Instantaneous Manifestations through Independent Distributions

The concept of decay is traditionally understood as a gradual, continuous process of transformation, implying the existence of an underlying entity that changes states over time. This paper challenges that view, arguing that the idea of “transition” or “conversion” is ontologically and mathematically flawed. Instead, it proposes that what we perceive as decay is merely the result of independently distributed, discrete manifestations. This framework, rooted in probabilistic models and Markovian dynamics, asserts that no persistent entity undergoes transformation. Change is thus conceptualized as a sequence of independent events, rather than as a continuous process.

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1. Introduction: Problematic Assumptions of Decay and Transition

Decay and transition imply:

The persistence of a stable entity over time, which transforms or degrades.

A continuous process through which change occurs.

However, such assumptions face both ontological and mathematical challenges. Ontologically, assuming an unchanging entity undergoing decay raises questions about what persists across transformations—if all aspects of the entity change, what remains? Mathematically, continuous change models introduce dependencies between states over time, which implies memory or history—a problematic assumption in many real-world scenarios governed by randomness.

This paper presents a proof that phenomena typically described as decay are better modelled as independent, stochastic events rather than continuous processes. These events are instantaneous, with no underlying persistence or continuity.

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2. Mathematical Foundations: Independent and Identically Distributed Processes

2.1 Definitions and Assumptions

A system governed by independently distributed (ID) processes has the following properties:

No dependence on prior states: The outcome of the next event is unaffected by the history of the system.

Discrete events: Each state or outcome is generated independently, without any notion of transition or transformation.

Formally, let St represent the state of a system at time t. For an independently distributed process:

P(St+1=s∣ St =s′)=P(St+1=s),

where s and s′ are arbitrary states. This indicates that the probability of a state occurring at time t+1 is independent of the previous state.

2.2 IID Processes in Physics and Biology

This framework aligns with various phenomena in physics and biology.

Radioactive decay is typically modeled by exponential distributions, where the probability of an event (e.g., emission of a particle) is constant over time and independent of prior emissions.

Biological systems that seem to age or decay over time (e.g., cell apoptosis) can be understood as sequences of independent cellular states, with no persistent underlying self that degrades continuously.

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3. Critique of Decay as a Continuous Process

3.1 Ontological Issues: The Fallacy of a Stable Entity

If decay were a continuous process, it would require an entity that:

Persists over time, undergoing gradual transformation.

Retains some identity, even as it changes states.

This view faces an inherent contradiction. If every aspect of the entity changes over time, what remains to define its continuity? The notion of “conversion” implies both identity and change, which is a conceptual paradox. In reality, each manifestation is new, independent of prior states, leaving no room for the persistence of an entity.

3.2 Mathematical Inconsistency of Transition Models

Continuous models of decay (e.g., differential equations governing physical processes) introduce dependencies across time, implying that a system’s current state influences its future state. However, many real-world processes are better described by independent probabilities. The assumption of continuity introduces unnecessary memory effects, where none may exist.

The Markovian framework resolves this issue by assuming:

P(St+1=s ∣ St =s′)=P(St+1=s),

This equation demonstrates that each state manifests independently, with no need for transformation or conversion.

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4. Proof: Decay as Instantaneous Manifestations

Given the arguments above, I formally reject the concept of decay or transition as continuous processes. Instead, I propose the following theorem:

Theorem: Any sequence of observable states, previously interpreted as decay, can be accurately described as independent and discrete manifestations without implying an underlying transformation.

Proof:

Let St represent the state of the system at time t.

Assume the process generating St is independently distributed.

At each time point, the state St is drawn from the same probability distribution, with no dependence on previous states:

P(St)=P(St+k), ∀ k ∈ N.

Therefore, there is no transformation from St to St+1 ; instead, each state is an independent manifestation.

Thus, the appearance of decay is an illusion of continuity, projected by the observer. In reality, each state arises independently, governed by probabilistic laws.

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5. Implications of the Proof

5.1 Physics and Quantum Systems

In quantum mechanics, the collapse of the wavefunction exemplifies the idea of instantaneous manifestation. There is no gradual transition between superposed states—only discrete outcomes upon measurement. This aligns with my argument that change is an illusion of continuity, not a real process.

5.2 Biological and Chemical Systems

Processes such as aging or chemical decay can also be reinterpreted. Instead of viewing a system as transforming over time, we can model it as a sequence of independent physiological or molecular states, each occurring without reference to the previous.

5.3 Philosophical Implications: Rejecting Continuity

This framework aligns with non-self theories in philosophy, such as those found in Buddhism and cognitive science, which argue that the self is not a continuous entity but a collection of independent momentary states. The illusion of continuity is a cognitive projection, not a feature of reality.

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6. Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that the conventional understanding of decay and transition is fundamentally flawed. By assuming continuous transformation, traditional models introduce unnecessary complexities and contradictions. I have shown that all change can be modelled as independently distributed, instantaneous manifestations, with no need for a persistent entity or gradual transformation. This approach not only aligns with modern physics and probability theory but also offers a more coherent ontological framework for understanding change.

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References

Shannon, C. E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System Technical Journal, 27(3), 379–423.

Rovelli, C. (1997). Relational Quantum Mechanics. International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 35(8), 1637–1678.

Metzinger, T. (2004). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. MIT Press.

Wallace, A. (2005). The Taboo of Subjectivity: Toward a New Science of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.

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This note reframes the concept of decay as a sequence of instantaneous manifestations, governed by independent probabilistic laws. The result is a more accurate and parsimonious model of change that challenges conventional assumptions and has broad implications for science and philosophy.